Abstract-The principle of maximum entropy provides a powerful framework for estimating joint, conditional, and marginal probability distributions. However, there are many important distributions with elements of interaction and feedback where its applicability has not been established. This paper presents the principle of maximum causal entropy-an approach based on directed information theory for estimating an unknown process based on its interactions with a known process. We demonstrate the breadth of the approach using two applications: a predictive solution for inverse optimal control in decision processes and computing equilibrium strategies in sequential games.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE principle of maximum entropy [21] serves a foundational role in the theory and practice of constructing statistical models [55] , with applicability to statistical mechanics [21] , [22] , natural language processing [3] , [36] , [43] , [47] , econometrics [15] , finance [7] , [10] , ecology [12] , and other fields [26] . It provides robust prediction guarantees by prescribing the probability distribution estimate that only commits as far as required to satisfy existing knowledge about an unknown distribution, and is otherwise as uncertain as possible [17] , [57] . Conditional extensions of the principle that consider a sequence of provided information (i.e., additional variables that are not predicted, but are related to random variables that are predicted), and conditional random fields [31] specifically, have been applied with remarkable success in recognition, segmentation, and classification tasks. They are a preferred tool in natural language processing [31] , [53] , computer vision [30] , [48] , and activity recognition [32] , [59] applications.
In this study, we extend the maximum entropy approach to estimating probability distributions in settings characterized by interaction with a known process. For example, consider the task of estimating an agent's interactions with a stochastic environment. The agent may know how each of its available actions in each of its possible states will probabilistically transition to future states, but, due to stochasticity, it does not know what value each future state will take until after selecting the sequence of actions temporally preceding it. Existing maximum entropy approaches either assume that all of the values generated by the known process are available a priori (maximum conditional entropy and conditional random field [31] models) or treat both the known and unknown processes with the same degree of ignorance (maximum joint entropy models). Interaction with a known process lies in between these two extremes, requiring a new technique to construct appropriate probability distribution estimates.
Building on the recent advance of the Marko-Massey theory of directed information [34] , [35] , we present the principle of maximum causal entropy. It prescribes a probability distribution by maximizing the entropy of a sequence of random variables conditioned on the information available from the known process at each time step. This contribution extends the maximum entropy framework for statistical estimation to interacting processes. We motivate and apply this approach on decision prediction tasks that are characterized by actions that stochastically influence a system's sequentially revealed state. The principle of maximum causal entropy unifies recent inverse optimal control approaches from computer science [1] , [4] , [13] , [41] , [65] with structural estimation methods from econometrics [52] , providing predictive guarantees for the former, and a more generalizable formulation to the latter. We demonstrate the approach's applicability using examples from inverse optimal control and multiplayer dynamic games.
Though we emphasize the connection to decision making and sequential games in this study, it is important to note that the principle of maximum causal entropy is not specific to decision making domains. It is a general approach that is applicable to any setting where sequential data are generated from two interacting processes-one known and one unknown. Further, maximum causal entropy is compatible with existing conditional and joint entropy maximization techniques.
II. PROCESS ESTIMATION TASK
This paper addresses the problem of estimating an unknown process that is interacting with a known process. Formally, the unknown process is a probability distribution over a sequence of random variables that take on values from sets (the predicted sequence), given a different sequence of 0018-9448/$31.00 © 2013 IEEE symbols from sets (the provided sequence) generated from the known process. We refer the reader to Appendix A for a detailed description of our notation.
A. Motivating Example
We consider a simple motivating example with two probabilistic sender-receivers communicating over a noiseless, bi-directional binary channel. Each receives a one-bit message from the channel and then sends a one-bit message. We refer to the mapping from each sender-receiver's history to its new message as a response function. The response function of one sender-receiver is known and the response function of the other is unknown. However, some properties of their joint interactions are known: over communication sequences of infinite length, the number of "0" bits and "1" bits sent over the channel are equal, and the frequency of five consecutive "1" bits over the channel is less than 3%.
Given this setting, how should the unknown sender-receiver response function be estimated? There are two important characteristics of the task to consider. First, the known properties of the channel's usage often do not fully constrain the unknown elements; many different schemes for the unknown encoder may realize those properties. Second, those known properties are defined in terms of the interaction between the known and unknown sender-receivers rather than isolated properties only of the unknown sender-receiver.
B. Conditional Probability Distribution Estimation
The typical process estimation approach uses available observations from the unknown process to fit a parametric conditional probability distribution. For example, a conditional multinomial distribution, logistic function, or Gaussian distribution could be employed using a stationarity assumption to estimate a time-invariant process,
. By employing observations from the interacting known and unknown processes, this approach allows the unknown process to be estimated independently of any knowledge of the provided process (beyond the observations).
As seen by our motivating example (see Section II-A), it is quite natural to consider characteristics of interacting processes that are defined over the joint distribution of message sequences. Unfortunately, these types of known characteristics cannot be appropriately leveraged when independently estimating conditional probability distributions. For example, the property of having long-term parity in the communication channel bits explicitly depends on both the known process and the unknown process. To overcome these limitations, formulations that consider the interaction of the known and unknown processes-rather than treating them separately-are needed.
C. Joint Probability Decompositions
By the chain rule, any joint probability distribution can be represented as a product of conditional probabilities. The canonical factorization for a joint distribution of two sequences of random variables is [27] for: the canonical decomposition of the joint probability distribution where the three time step sequence of variables is conditioned on the sequence of variables (left); and the decomposition of the three time step joint probability distribution into two interacting processes (right). The two differ in the direction of three edges connecting variables with variables.
in which the probability distribution for given information, , is first formed, and then, the probability of the sequence of predicted random variables is multiplied in using conditional probability distributions that condition on all of the provided variables to form the joint distribution (see the left of Fig. 1 ). Unfortunately, this decomposition for the random variables does not coincide with a known process, since the random variables should also depend on previous random variables-the other sender-receiver's messages in our earlier example. Nor does the distribution for correspond to a known process; its distribution under this decomposition violates the properties of temporal processes-the conditional probabilities depend on future variables, , as also indicated by the antitemporal edges in the left of Fig. 1 (e.g., from to ). An alternative application of the chain rule to the joint sequence distribution factors the provided and the predicted variables as two interacting temporal processes: (1) This decomposition coincides with settings having feedback, such as our simple communications example or sequential decision making processes. In decision settings, it is natural to have a model of the state dynamics process, , in which the next state depends on the previous controls, , and states, . This feedback cycle is shown by the directed paths from, e.g., to to on the right of Fig. 1 and has a causal interpretation: future state variables are unknown when past controls are selected, and thus, their values have no direct influence on preceding control variables.
We make use of this decomposition throughout the remainder of this paper when we are estimating the latter process of the joint distribution (i.e., the controller's decision process),
, when the former process (i.e., the state-transition dynamics process), , is known.
III. PRINCIPLE OF MAXIMUM CAUSAL ENTROPY
Motivated by the task of estimating a process based on its interactions with another known process without relying on local estimations, we introduce the principle of maximum causal entropy in this section.
A. Directed Information Theory
The Marko-Massey theory of directed information [34] , [35] has investigated the components of the interacting temporal decomposition of the joint distribution (1). The causally conditioned probability [28] (2) reflects the causal restriction that future provided variables (e.g., ) do not influence earlier predicted variables (e.g., ). In contrast to the conditional probability
variable of the causally conditioned probability (2) is only conditioned on previous variables, , rather than also being conditioned on future variables, . This subtle, but significant, difference from the conditional probability (3) serves as the basis for our approach. Multiplicatively combining with the complementary causally conditioned distribution (4) yields the joint probability distribution, , following the same decomposition shown in (1).
The uncertainty or "noncommittedness" of a probability distribution is measured by the Shannon entropy [54] . The conditional entropy, , measures this uncertainty when provided information, , is available up front. The analogous notion of causal entropy (see Definition 1) for directed information theory measures the uncertainty present in the causally conditioned distribution of the variable sequence given the preceding partial variable sequence.
Definition 1:
The causal entropy [28] , [46] of given is (5) It can be interpreted as the expected number of bits (when is employed) needed to minimally encode samples from the sequence , iteratively over , given the previous variables and sequentially revealed input, , up to that point in time, and excluding unrevealed future provided variables . It thus measures the compressibility of information in a feedback channel [28] .
Causal entropy can be incorporated with other entropy measures using its conditional entropy decomposition from Definition 1-for instance, with joint variables and with traditional conditioning, which we discuss in more detail in Appendix A.
Causal entropy has previously been applied in the analysis of communication channels with feedback [28] , decentralized control [56] , inferring causal relationships [49] , [50] , sequential investment, and online compression with provided information [46] . This paper contributes the notion of causal entropy for estimating probability distributions.
Definition 2:
The causal cross entropy or causal log-loss of given for causal distribution under joint distribution is
The causal log likelihood of data distributed according to is the negative of the causal log-loss (see Definition 2). The causal log-loss measures the compressibility of a feedback channel when using a causally conditioned probability distribution estimate, , rather than the true causally conditioned distribution. It is a natural measure for evaluating a causally conditioned probability estimator and can be directly related to the expected growth rate of gambling on outcome sequence under uniform odds [9] , [46] .
B. Causally Conditioned Probability Distributions via Affine Constraints
Unfortunately, the definition of causally conditioned probabilities as products of conditional probabilities (2) is not well suited for optimization procedures-it is a nonlinear function of the unknown conditional probabilities, . In this section, we introduce an affinely constrained definition of causally conditioned probabilities that supports convex optimization, and show that it is equivalent to the previous definition.
Definition 3:
The class of causally conditioned probability distributions, denoted , is defined by the following causal polytope of affine constraints for any 1 :
The final set of constraints (9) ensures causal independence-that past conditioned variables are not functions of future conditioning variables . Without it, a conditional probability distribution would be defined.
Theorem 1:
Using the definition of causally conditioned probabilities in terms of affine constraints (see Definition 3), interdependent causally conditioned probability distributions together form valid joint probability distributions 2 :
Corollary 1: The causally conditioned probability distributions defined according to affine constraints (see Definition 3) are equivalent to the causally conditioned probability distributions defined by the decomposition into a product of conditional probabilities:
. This formulation of the causally conditioned probability distribution using the causal polytope (see Definition 3) enables the efficient optimization for the principle of maximum causal entropy. Throughout the remainder of this paper, whenever the variables of an optimization correspond to a causally conditioned probability distribution, they should be interpreted to reside within the causal polytope of Definition 3.
C. Maximum Causal Entropy
The principle of maximum entropy [21] prescribes the probability distribution estimator that is the "least committed" (or most uncertain) apart from matching known properties of the distribution being estimated. This is realized by maximizing the Shannon entropy [54] subject to constraints. Many of the fundamental building block distributions of statistics (e.g., Gaussians), though often derived by other means, can be obtained by this approach using moment-matching constraints. In fact, there is a general duality between maximum entropy (or conditional entropy) estimation problems and maximum likelihood (or conditional likelihood) estimation of exponential family probability distributions [23] . For example, maximizing the conditional entropy, , given constraints on cliques of variables, ,
where is a subset of and denotes the true distribution being estimated, yields conditional random fields [31] (see the center of Fig. 2 ) (13) a state-of-the-art statistical estimation technique.
We extend the principle of maximum entropy to estimate (with estimator ) an unknown causally 2 The proofs of each theorem and corollary are presented in Appendix B. Fig. 2 . Three probability distribution estimation tasks of the unknown white components (given the known gray components): joint distribution estimation of (left); conditional distribution estimation of (center); and causally conditioned distribution estimation of given a known interacting process (right), which can be estimated by maximizing the joint entropy, the conditional entropy, and the causal entropy, respectively. conditioned probability distribution, , that interacts with a known causally conditioned probability distribution, , as shown on the right of Fig. 2 . Together, these probability distributions satisfy a set of constraints defined in terms of the joint distribution (see Definition 4) and the unknown distribution can be obtained as the result of a convex optimization problem (see Theorem 2).
Definition 4:
The principle of maximum causal entropy prescribes the causally conditioned entropy-maximizing probability distribution estimator, , from the causal polytope (see Definition 3): (14) for affine functions 3 and . More specifically, the two affine constraints can always be written as expectations of feature functions, and :
which we will make use of later in this study. We note that these constraints are also affine in the unknown variables, but not in the multiplicative factors of those variables, e.g., .
Theorem 2: The maximum causal entropy optimization problem (14) is a convex optimization problem.
D. Lagrangian Duality
The primal problem of the maximum causal entropy optimization (14) is a potentially high-dimensional one in the space of probability distributions. The Lagrangian dual may be much more compact when the feature function dimensionality, , is smaller than the causally conditioned probability distribution's dimensionality, . As we shall show, its optimal solution is also an optimal solution for the primal problem.
Theorem 3:
The Lagrangian dual optimization problem of the primal maximum causal entropy problem (see Definition 4) is (17) The solution to this problem (i.e., the estimated probability distribution) can be expressed recursively as (18) Due to convexity (see Theorem 2), the optimal values obtained by the dual and primal optimization problems are equivalent under mild technical considerations. (See Theorem 4).
Theorem 4:
Strong Lagrangian duality [6] , i.e., no gap between the primal optimization problem (14) and the dual optimization problem (17) , holds for the maximum causal entropy estimation task when a feasible solution to the primal optimization (14) exists on the relative interior, i.e., . Subgradient-based optimization 4 with adaptive learning rate can be employed to obtain optimal parameters using parameter updates: (19) with expectations calculated according to the Lagrangian dual's form of the probability distribution (18) .
E. Maximum Causal Likelihood
The equivalency of maximum entropy estimation and maximum likelihood estimation in exponential random families [23] extends to the causally conditioned setting.
Theorem 5: Subject to moment-matching constraints, i.e., (via in (15) , using statistics from the true distribution within Definition 4 and no inequality constraints, maximizing the causal entropy is equivalent to maximizing the (log) causal likelihood (see Definition 2) of the true data distribution (20) Often, moment statistics are estimated from a limited number of samples, , where the sample distribution is obtained from samples of the joint distribution. This causes probabilistically bounded approximation error (see Theorem 6) as opposed to using the true joint distribution as in Theorem 5.
Theorem 6:
If are sample means of the statistic (i.e., under distribution ), then the difference between sample mean and expectation is bounded as
The constraints of the maximum causal entropy primal optimization problem (14) can be relaxed to allow a small amount of slack to address this approximation error. This leads to regularized maximum causal likelihood estimation in the dual optimization problem [12] , which is a common statistical estimation technique to avoid overfitting to a small sample dataset.
F. Robust Performance Guarantees
Though the principle of maximum entropy is often justified with the philosophical argument that no additional assumptions should be made except known constraints [21] , it can instead be derived as a robust estimation procedure for minimizing the predictive log-loss [17] , [57] . We present the principle of maximum causal entropy's derivation as a robust causally conditioned probability estimator in this section.
We consider the setting in which the joint probability distribution, , that is obtained by combining an unknown causally conditioned probability distribution, , with a known causally conditioned probability distribution, , is known to satisfy a set of convex constraints (e.g., those from (14)). We would like to construct an estimator that minimizes the causal log-loss (see Definition 2) evaluated according to the joint distribution . However, since the joint distribution is only partially known, our estimator can be made more robust (i.e., better worst-case performance) compared to estimators that make unwarranted assumptions, by instead treating unknown factors of the joint distribution as being chosen adversarially (i.e., to maximize the estimator's log-loss).
This setting can be viewed as a two-step game in which the first player chooses an estimate for each possible contingency of the sequence, , and then the second player, with knowledge of this choice, chooses the distribution from a restricted subset of causally conditioned probability distributions that satisfy known constraints. The resulting adversarial causal log-loss minimization task is (21) Theorem 7: Adversarial log-loss minimization (21) is equivalent to maximizing the causal entropy subject to the same sets of constraints (14) under the assumptions of Theorem 4.
G. Generalization and Special Cases
Entropy measures are implicitly relative to a uniform probability distribution. They can be generalized using the relative causal entropy or causal Kullback-Leibler divergence [29] ( 22) given baseline causally conditioned probability distribution . This is generally necessary to ensure invariance to variable transformations when estimating continuous probability distributions [55] . In the causal setting, this yields log causally conditioned probability distributions that are in proportion to . While it may be attractive to incorporate background knowledge by using a "nonuniform" relative probability distribution, the equivalent model can be learned (possibly from a larger set of potential baseline distributions ) by incorporating constraint:
and using a standard "uniform" relative probability distribution.
When is a deterministic probability distribution (i.e., , in contrast to ), there is no uncertainty in the future provided information given the sequence of previously occurring predicted variables. In this case, the causal entropy reduces to the conditional entropy, where the conditioning information can be thought of as the variables specifying the next conditioned variable given a history, . This special case has been investigated for modeling decision making [65] and applied to predicting the driving routes and destinations of drivers on road networks [66] , and the movements of pedestrians for more intelligent robotic path planning [19] , [67] .
IV. INVERSE OPTIMAL CONTROL
Stochastic decision problems closely match the causal assumption of our approach. Typically, prescribing the optimal action to employ given a cost or reward measure has been of central focus for decision theorists. However, understanding the inverse problem-the recovery of a reward function that motivates observed behavior in sequential decision settings-is also important for a number of behavior forecasting applications.
Though our formulation of the maximum causal entropy estimation approach does not rely on a control-based perspective, we show in this section that it provides a general probabilistic solution to the inverse optimal control problem.
A. Background
Inverse optimal control (also known as inverse reinforcement learning) [5] , [25] , [41] describes the problem of recovering an agent's reward function, given a controller or policy, when the remainder of the decision process is known. We consider the discrete decision process formulation where the rewards motivating behavior are linearly parameterized [1] . The MDP is solved for a specific vector of reward weights by finding the policy, (more generally stochastic, ), prescribing an action to take in each state, that maximizes the total reward.
Inverse optimal control techniques that assume behavior is optimal for some choice of reward weights [8] , [41] are often ill-posed [41] -many reward weights, including degeneracies (e.g., the all zeros reward vector), will make observed behavior optimal-and, when observed behavior is noisy and inherently suboptimal, degenerate solutions will often be the only reward parameters that can make observe behavior optimal.
Abbeel and Ng [1] resolve some of these difficulties by recovering a (mixture of) -MDP solution(s) guaranteeing the same reward (in expectation) as the demonstrated trajectories for any choice of parameter . This reduces to matching the optimal controller's expected feature counts, with those of the demonstrated trajectories:
where . Unfortunately, when suboptimal behavior is demonstrated (due to the agent's imperfection or inevitable approximations of the model), the approach can assign zero probability to demonstrated training behavior [65] . Other inverse optimal control approaches can avoid this issue [40] , [51] , but lack reward-equivalency performance guarantees.
Structural estimation [52] takes a latent-variable perspective to the problem. In addition to assuming that the reward function of a state-action pair is a linear function of known features, , unobservable influences also contribute to the reward. These are incorporated as exogenous "shock" error terms, : . Only certain error distributions [37] admit closed-form solutions, which match the maximum causal entropy's prescribed distribution in the discrete choice setting [52] . Unfortunately, establishing appropriate error term distributions for the influences of latent variables in other decision settings is difficult. As we show in this study, the maximum causal entropy approach can be applied to decision estimation tasks and multiagent strategic decision making without requiring explicit construction of latent variable influences.
B. Maximum Causal Entropy Inverse Optimal Control
We formulate the inverse optimal control problem as a maximum causal entropy estimation task. Despite the differences in formulation, a number of important connections to decision theory result. For control and decision-making domains, the predicted variables, , correspond to an agent's sequence of employed actions, . The variables with known dynamics, , correspond to the agent's sequence of states,
. We assume Markovian state dynamics, denoted , that are either explicitly provided or estimated from data using a separate procedure. Since future states are only revealed after actions are selected, they should have no causal influence over earlier actions. This matches the causal assumptions of the maximum causal entropy model. We refer to the causally conditioned action distribution as a stochastic policy, , with factors that are often Markovian, .
Definition 6:
The maximum causal entropy inverse optimal control estimator is a special case of the general maximum causal entropy optimization (14) problem, , with linear equality constraints (23) The maximum causal entropy distribution of (18) simplifies greatly when feature functions linearly decompose over time steps, i.e., .
C. Inference as Softened Optimal Control
Surprisingly, though formulated from information theory, the maximum causal entropy probability distribution is a generalization of optimal control laws governing decision theory. By replacing the log partition functions, and with analogs to state-action values, , and state values, , which we will call value potentials, the connection to the Bellman equation [2] is established by Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 (of Theorem 3):
The maximum causal entropy distribution constrained to match feature functions (see Definition 6) that decompose linearly over time, i.e., , and with Markovian dynamics, can be re-expressed as (24) (25) where provides a smooth (i.e., differentiable) interpolation of the maximum of different functions.
The gap between an action's value potential and the state's value potential, , determines that action's probability within the maximum causal entropy inverse optimal control model:
. When the gaps of multiple actions approach equality, the probabilities of those actions become uniform under the distribution. In the opposite limit, when the gap between one action and all others grows large, the softmax operation behaves like the maximum function and the stochastic maximum causal entropy policy approaches determinism, converging to the optimal policy of the Bellman equation [2] , which only differs in the use of the function in (25) .
V. MAXIMUM ENTROPY CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA FOR MARKOV GAMES
The second setting we consider is the rational behavior of multiple players in sequential games. In this setting, the utilities governing players' decisions are known and obtaining equilibrium strategies for players is of interest.
A. Games and Equilibria
We consider sequential games with perfect information (i.e., each player knows the complete state of the game). Markov games (see Definition 7) formalize this setting, with each player choosing an action at each point in time based on the known state of the game, and players receiving some utility based on the combination of actions in each state. The canonical set of games studied within game theory-one-shot or normal-form games-are a special case of Markov game with only one time step of joint actions.
Definition 7:
A Markov game is defined by a set of states representing the joint states of agents (from set ), a set of joint actions , a probabilistic state transition function , and a utility function , specifying player 's utility for a sequence of states and actions.
Players choose strategy profiles, , specifying (a distribution of) next actions for each situation. We consider the most general set of strategy profiles: mixed (i.e., stochastic) and correlated (i.e., joint functions in which players' actions can be interdependent) based on a cumulative expected utility. The rationality of a strategy profile is based on the relative utility each player obtains by deviating from the strategy profile in different ways. A deviation policy, , specifies changes to the strategy profile. The utilities obtained under the strategy profile modified by the deviation policy are based on the interactions of causally conditioned probability distributions (as shown in Fig. 3 ):
Often, the set of deviation policies corresponding to switch functions, , is considered, which allows one player to switch from a provided action, , to an alternate action, , (the remaining action mapping does not switch actions, i.e., ).
Definition 8:
A correlated equilibrium (CE) for a Markov game is a mixed joint strategy profile, , where no expected gain is obtained for any agent by employing a switch deviation policy. This is guaranteed with the following set of constraints: (28) where and is a switch for player 's action.
Correlated equilibria (see Definition 8) generalize Nash equilibria [39] , which further require agents' actions in each state to be independent, i.e.,
. Agents in a CE can coordinate their actions to obtain higher expected utilities. Conceptually, each agent is provided an action, , and knows the conditional distribution of other agents' actions, . To be in CE requires that no agent has an incentive to switch from action to a deviation action, , given that knowledge. Traffic lights are a canonical example of a signaling device designed to produce CE strategies. Given other agents' prescribed strategies (go on green), an agent will have incentive (equivalently, nonpositive deviation regret) to obey a prescribed action (stop on red) rather than deviating (go on red). However, this coordination mechanism is not required as long as the players have access to a public communications channel [11] . Past research has shown that many decentralized, adaptive strategies will converge to some subset of strategies within the set of CE [14] , [16] , [18] , [42] , and not necessarily to the more restrictive Nash equilibrium. The deviation regret constraints (28) define an N-dimensional convex polytope of CE solutions in the space of agents' joint utility payoffs (see Fig. 4 ). Exactly representing this polytope is generally intractable for Markov games, because the number of corners of the polytope grows exponentially with the game's time horizon. Efficient approximation approaches have been employed [33] , [38] , but tractable applicability has been limited to small games [33] . For the far more modest goal of finding an arbitrary CE in a range of compact games, algorithms that are polynomial in the number of agents have been developed [24] , [45] and extended to sequential games [20] .
The maximum entropy correlated equilibria (MaxEntCE) solution concept for normal-form games [44] selects the unique joint strategy profile that maximizes the joint entropy of players' actions subject to linear deviation regret inequality constraints (28) . This approach provides the predictive guarantees of maximum entropy [17] in the single time step (normal-form) multiagent game setting.
Consider the game of Chicken (where each agent hopes the other will Swerve) and the correlated equilibria that define its utility polytope in Table I . CE 4 is the maximum entropy CE and its predictive guarantee is apparent: all other CE have infinite log-loss when evaluated under the distribution of at least one other CE; the MaxEntCE is the only CE that assigns positive probability to the {Stay, Stay} action combination. We extend these predictive guarantees to the Markov game setting in this study.
B. Maximum Causal Entropy Correlated Equilibria
We extend the maximum entropy CE approach to sequential games by posing it as a maximum causal entropy problem. The causally conditioned entropy measure (5) for this multiplayer game setting is (29) For the possible sequences of states and actions in a Markov game, it corresponds to the uncertainty associated with only the actions of the players in such sequences.
Definition 9:
A maximum causal entropy correlated equilibrium (MCECE) solution maximizes the causal entropy (29) , while satisfying the CE constraints (28) given the game dynamics . The regret constraints can be expressed in the maximum causal entropy framework as (30) for deviation policies, , corresponding to each switch function for each player . By including a small amount of slack, , to provide primal feasibility, subgame equilibria are realized by the Lagrangian dual solution, meaning that even in states where the probability of being reached converges toward 0, under the strategy profile and state dynamics, the strategy profile satisfies equilibria constraints (28) in all subgames starting from those states.
Theorem 8:
Subject to the feasibility requirements of Theorem 4, the MCECE strategy profile, , has the recursive form (with ):
where denotes the regret of a particular switch function from to given the other players' actions . Thus, by employing the principle of maximum causal entropy, we have expanded the MaxEntCE solution concept [44] to the Markov game setting.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduced the principle of maximum causal entropy for estimating probability distributions where elements of interaction and feedback exist. We demonstrated its applicability and effectiveness on two very different statistical estimation tasks-discrete control and strategic Markovian games-to illustrate its generality.
APPENDIX A NOTATIONAL CONVENTIONS
We lowercase values of variables (e.g., , ), capitalize random variables (e.g., , ), embolden sequence multivariates (e.g., , ), and denote sets with calligraphy (e.g., ,
), where temporal ranges, e.g., , are compactly represented as, e.g.,
. We generally employ as the index of the last variable of the sequence (multivariate) and other time indexes, e.g., and , as indexes to other temporal positions in the sequence.
A probability distribution over random variables, e.g., , which is a member of the probability simplex , implies the probability for each specific value, e.g.,
.
We denote estimated probability distributions as and sample probability distributions as
. Expectations over random variables make the distribution of the random variables explicit, e.g., . When the distribution defining the entropy is unclear (i.e., not ), we denote with subscript the defining distribution, e.g.,
. An entropy can be conditioned on specific values, e.g., or, in the causal entropy case, .
APPENDIX B PROOFS OF THE THEOREMS
Proof of Theorem 1: (10) is trivially implied by the nonnegativity constraints on both causally conditioned probabilities (7) .
To show that the second constraint (11) is implied, we must first introduce additional notation. We let denote a partial replacement sequence for in which have been replaced with a different sequence of symbols, . The proof procedure operates by "unzipping" the joint distribution:
The variable(s) that appear in only one of the causally conditioned distributions are separately marginalized over (a) and that independent marginal replaced with a replacement sequence via the property of (9) (b). Due to this replacement, one additional variable then only appears in the other causally conditioned probability distribution and the procedure can alternate with separate marginalization (c) and replacement (d). This operation can be repeated to the elements of the sequences (as shown) (e) and then for the entire sequence (f). Finally, using the normalization property of the two causally conditioned probability distributions (8) concludes the proof (g).
Proof of Corollary 1:
Using the definition of the conditional probability in terms of the marginalized joint probability (see Theorem 1), and following the same partial replacement notation and "unzipping" procedure of the proof of Theorem 1, we have Similarly, following an analogous argument for the causally conditioned variables.
To complete the proof, we must show that the product of conditional probabilities definition (2) of the causally conditioned probability satisfies the causal polytope definition (see Definition 3). The nonnegativity constraint (7) is satisfied by the nonnegativity of conditional probability distributions. The remaining two constraints are satisfied as a consequence of noting that:
because each conditional probability distribution (starting from the right-most) normalizes to 1. Thus, (8) is satisfied for and (9) is satisfied as completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2:
The negative causally conditioned entropy, , is a conic combination of terms, which are each convex for . The optimization constraints based on the joint probability terms are all affine in the unknown causally conditioned probability terms. The intersection with the causal polytope (see Definition 3) is also convex. Thus, the overall optimization is a convex optimization problem.
We now prove two lemmas that are needed for the proof of Theorem 3.
Lemma 1:
The Lagrangian dual optimization problem's solution is the probability distribution recursively defined according to (18) .
Proof: We begin by obtaining the form of the probability distribution in the Lagrangian dual optimization problem. Note that since the domain of the objective (the causal entropy) is only on the nonnegative causally conditioned probability terms, , the nonnegativity constraints from the causal polytope are superfluous, and we will suppress them. Differentiating the Lagrangian of the maximum causal entropy optimization (14) , where the causal probability constraints are replaced with the locally normalizing constraints (which are equivalent by Corollary 1), (31) we have (with ):
Equating the gradient to and solving for yields Starting with the recursive relationship constraining the causally conditioned probability distribution (32), we go further to prove the operational recurrence of the theorem (18) . We begin by factoring out the multiplier. We prove the lemma by substituting our recursive definitions (17) and (18) to show that they are solutions to the recurrence (33) Thus, setting , which is only a function of and (and, importantly, not ), proves the distribution form.
Lemma 2:
Under the Lagrangian dual's form of the probability distribution (Lemma 1),
, and another distribution , the conditioned causal log-loss (see Definition 2) has the following relationship:
Proof: Using the recursive form under the dual (17) and (18) 
Proof of Theorem 4:
The primal optimization problem is convex (see Theorem 2); thus, by Slater's condition for affine inequality constraints [6] , as long as there is a feasible solution satisfying the constraint set in the primal optimization problem on the relative interior, the strong Lagrangian duality holds-there is no duality gap between the primal optimization problem and the dual optimization problem:
For our problem, this requires (34) Note that when the only primal feasible solution violates strict positivity (34) , nonfinite dual parameters would be required. This can be alleviated by allowing small slack in the equality and inequality constraints:
leading to Lagrangian multiplier regularization in the dual optimization problem [12] . We also discuss adding slack in Section III-E to deal with finite sample approximations.
Proof of Theorem 5:
Writing the Lagrangian dual (17) for these constraints and then relying on Lemma 2, we have completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 6:
Letting each sample's moment statistic be bounded within , by Hoeffding's inequality, we have By the union bound:
Combining these, and recognizing that: while letting and , proves the theorem.
We now prove an important saddle point existence lemma needed for Theorem 7.
Lemma 3: Under the restriction that is from the set of causally conditioned probability distributions satisfying provided equality and inequality constraints, and (14) , and assuming strong Lagrangian duality holds (see Theorem 4), the causal log-loss (see Definition 2), has a saddle point, : the maximum causal entropy distribution (see Definition 4) . In other words
Proof: Equality (a): For any , as a special case of Lemma 2,
The inequality follows from the constraints on the set : any satisfies (with equality) and (with inequality) . Note that (35) is the dual optimization objective (17) and it reaches its optima at .
Equality (b): For any :
The inequality follows from an "information bound" on the causal Kullback-Leibler divergence (22): , which is tight when
Proof of Theorem 7:
In what follows, we let denote the causal polytope defining causally conditioned probability distributions and let denote the subset of that satisfies: and .
The first equality (minimax) follows from the existence of the saddle point established in Lemma 3. The second follows from the fact that setting the estimate to the adversarially chosen distribution is then optimal for the minimization. Finally, the result follows from the definition of causal entropy (see Definition 1).
Proof of Corollary 2:
Following the proof of Lemma 1, we substitute the softened maximum causal entropy recurrence (24) and (25) into (33) to verify that it is a solution to the Lagrangian dual optimization problem.
where . Thus, setting to the remaining terms, , completes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 8:
We first re-express the optimization problem in terms of each of the alternative actions corresponding to the set of switch functions (36) where is the regret corresponding to the switch function for player from action to at time given history and . We find the form of the probability distribution by finding the optimal solution of the Lagrangian dual optimization problem. We suppress the probabilistic positivity constraints and normalization constraints with the understanding that the resulting probability distribution must normalize to 1.
The Lagrangian for the optimization of (36) when using entire history-dependent probability distributions and parameters is Taking the partial derivative with respect to a history-dependent action probability for a particular state, we have (37) where here the regret is conditioned on the other players' actions . The form of the history-dependent distribution (38) is obtained by equating (37) to zero and dividing off the (constant) probability term, .
APPENDIX C ALTERNATIVE ENTROPY MAXIMIZATION APPROACHES
Can the same process estimates obtained by maximizing the causal entropy instead be obtained by maximizing more familiar entropy measures? The connection to the Bellman equation [2] established in Section IV-C allows us to answer this question by illustrating and interpreting the differences when employing other entropy measures.
Maximizing the conditional entropy of actions given states, , provides a distribution of the form:
. As future states are latent, a common approach [58] , [65] is to marginalize over the future latent states and actions, yielding a recursive expression for the conditional probability, :
It can be interpreted as allowing the (softmax) selection of the next state with the best state value potential with a penalty of incurred for realizing the desired state dynamics transition. In contrast, under the maximum causal entropy distribution and the Bellman equation, the expectation over the next state is taken according to the dynamics model.
Maximizing the joint entropy subject to constraints enforcing the dynamics distribution yields the following recursive definition of the conditional probability :
In contrast to the maximum causal entropy distribution (and the Bellman equation), more probability mass is assigned to actions leading toward portions of the state space where the dynamics are more stochastic. We refer the reader to our previous work [61] for an illustrative example of these differences.
